Poli 520: Approaches to Comparative Government

Class Time: 3:10-5:50 Thursday.
Instructor: Randy Stevenson
Office Hours: By Appointment.

CONNECTION TO PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES:
This course contributes primarily to the first learning outcome for the political science Ph.D., but will also help you with your evaluation of research designs and methodologies, your communication skills, your teaching ability, and your professional development. The program learning outcomes for the political science Ph.D. are as follows:

- Demonstrate advanced knowledge of theoretical and empirical research in two of the following three sub-fields of Political Science: American politics, comparative politics, and international relations.
- Learn and apply social science research design and methodologies, including advanced statistical techniques.
- Demonstrate the ability to communicate their research effectively through multiple mediums including scholarly writing, oral presentation, and poster sessions.
- Demonstrate their competence as political scientist.

SPECIAL NOTES RELATED TO ONLINE-DELIVERY AND COVID-19:

Students attending remotely must have a working computer with a video camera, speaker, and microphone, and a working internet connection that allows the student to be on video during class. Please contact the instructor immediately if you have any concerns about this, or about keeping your camera on during class.

We will not be recording our discussions except if one or more students must attend a session asynchronously for reasons arranged with the instructor. In line with FERPA requirements, recorded classroom discussions involving students will be available only to students officially registered and enrolled in the class. If you have concerns about appearing on these recordings, please contact the instructor ahead of time.

I recognize this is an unusual semester, and I thank you in advance for your flexibility and cooperation as we navigate this together.

EVALUATION

Grades will be determined as follows:

25% Class Discussion (judged on preparation and participation)

25% Discussion Papers/

50% Research presentations and Final Paper.

RICE HONOR CODE:
In this course, all students will be held to the standards of the Rice Honor Code, a code that you pledged to honor when you matriculated at this institution. If you are unfamiliar with the details of this code and how it is administered, you should consult the Honor System Handbook at http://honor.rice.edu/honor-system-handbook/. This handbook outlines the University's expectations for the integrity of your academic work, the procedures for resolving alleged violations of those expectations, and the rights and responsibilities of students and faculty members throughout the process.

DISABILITY RESOURCE CENTER:
If you have a documented disability or other condition that may affect academic performance you should: 1) make sure this documentation is on file with the Disability Resource Center (Allen Center, Room 111 / adarice@rice.edu / x5841) to determine the accommodations you need; and 2) speak with the instructor to discuss your accommodation needs. The Department of Political Science is happy to do whatever we can to assure each student full and rewarding participation in classes.

TITLE IX RESPONSIBLE EMPLOYEE NOTIFICATION:
Rice University cares about your wellbeing and safety. Rice encourages any student who has experienced an incident of harassment, pregnancy discrimination, or gender discrimination or relationship, sexual, or other forms interpersonal violence to seek support through The SAFE Office. At Rice University, unlawful discrimination in any form, including sexual misconduct, is prohibited under Rice Policy on Harassment and Sexual Harassment (Policy 830) and the Student Code of Conduct. As the instructor and a responsible employee, I am **required** by Title IX to disclose all incidents of non-consensual interpersonal behaviors to the Title IX Coordinator on campus. Although responsible employees are required to make this notification, it is the student's choice to pursue a formal complaint. The goal is to make sure that students are aware of the range of options available and have access to the resources when in need. For more information, please visit safe.rice.edu, titleixrice.edu, or email titleixsupport@rice.edu.

SYLLABUS CHANGE POLICY:
This syllabus is only a guide for the course and is subject to change with advance notice if conditions warrant a change.

RESEARCH PAPER

During this class you will produce a research paper that ***must*** have the structure of: "Theory: Hypothesis: Test". Further, I want this project to be one in which you:

1. Identify someone else's theory and then describe that theory completely (including perhaps restating it in formal language, providing a clearer verbal description of its assumptions and logic, and/or presenting an appropriate causal diagram that captures the theory). I will consider allowing an original theory on a case by case basis.

2. Derive (and describe) as many of the theory's empirical implications as possible, whether or not you think you can test them. In addition, identify which implications are causal claims and which are simply expected empirical associations.

3. Focus on one or more of these causal implications and develop an empirical research design to test those causal implications in a convincing way.

4. Collect the necessary data, clean it, document it, etc.

5. Perform the tests and present the results.

6. Write all of this up in a format, length (less than 10k words + appendix), and level of clarity sufficient for submission (and acceptance) to a journal.

The topic of the paper should engage the literature in comparative politics in some way, even if the topic also engages the literature in your primary field. For example, if you are in IR, you might do a paper in which outcome of interest is from IR (war, etc.) but important explanatory factors are domestic political institutions. Obviously, such a paper will need to engage more than one political context (so there is variation in the institutions).

We will reserve time each week for discussion and progress reports on the paper and you will present parts of the paper formally at various points. I may allow you to expand on a previous paper of yours if (1) I think it is sufficiently promising to be worth your time, (2) has sufficient room for improvement, and (3) meets all the criteria above.

WEEKLY DISCUSSION PAPERS

Due on Thursday of the week in which we will discuss the relevant work (before noon). Please email these to me at randytstevenson@gmail.com

Each week, please answer each of the following questions, for each numbered work listed unless I have marked it with an * (the * does not excuse you from reading and being able to discuss the material). Answer the questions in a short essay – no more than three single-sided, single spaced pages, but it can certainly be shorter – get to the point. You can expand on your point in the class discussion. The page limit includes all the works assigned. So if there are 3 articles then you get 1 page each, on average. Diagrams do not count against page length of your essay.

I would like to have a discussion of each of the numbered questions below and expect to see each answered in your essay. Please answer them in the order listed and provide numbered headings that pinpoint the answer to each question.

1. **Intended Contribution(s):** What is the intended contribution of the work? Here the choices are (in my view) some combination of the following potential contributions:
    a) Developing a new theory
    b) Extending, improving, or correcting an existing theory
    c) Describing a theory in a way that makes it more useful or accessible
    d) Identifying previously unappreciated assumptions of an existing theory or theories.
    e) Organizing a theoretical and/or empirical literature in ways intended to improve its clarity or usefulness.
    f) Deriving or otherwise identifying the empirical implications (empirical hypotheses) of a theory. The theory could be that described in (a)-(e) or could be some other existing theory.
    g) Testing the implications of a theory (its empirical hypotheses). This might require a causal inference or not – it depends on whether the implication of the theory is a causal inference.
    h) Making a causal inference in a situation in which the inference is not a test of a theory. (e.g., what is the impact of neighborhood policing on crime rates?)
    i) Empirical description – just collecting and presenting data to explain what exists without an attempt to make a causal inference (though perhaps a descriptive inference – e.g., how tall on average are Americans?)
    j) Introducing or improving empirical or theoretical methods, or measurement techniques.
    k) Providing new, more, or better data relevant to any of the contributions above.
    l) Criticism of other work but not as a part of any of the other contributions above.

If you identify an intended contribution that is not on the list above, then please elaborate its nature and point it out in class so I can add to the list.

2. **Importance:** Why does the author think the contribution is important? Usually, authors will justify the need for the work from a discussion of how the work fits into the previous academic literature on the subject. If so, the answer to this question will require you to ***describe salient aspects of the previous literature*** and how the author is trying to position the work relative to it. This is the part that ties the current work to the larger literature and so is crucial to answering questions in comprehensive exams, building syllabi, and identifying gaps in the literature. In some cases, the importance of the work may be justified in some other way (e.g., its social significance) or may not be justified at all. If either of these is the case, point it out. In all cases, tell me whether you agree with the authors' assessment of the importance of the intended contribution.

3. **Description and Assessment (theory):** If there is a theoretical contribution of some kind (contributions a-f), describe the relevant theory or theories.
    - First, whose behavior, attitudes, emotions, etc. does the theory seek to explain? (This can be tricky in some cases)
    - Before getting into the details of the theory, attempt to classify the broad theory of action that is being used in the theory. Below, I have provided a menu of (in my view) the usual theoretical options. If you find something you do not think fits into one of these, then let's discuss.
    - Next, if the contribution is such that a causal theory is offered and so a causal diagram instantiating the theoretical argument can be created, then create one.

- More generally, make a (perhaps non-causal) theoretical diagram whenever you can.
- Evaluate the extent to which the intended theoretical contribution has been successfully achieved.

Theories of Action:

1. I's Action stems from **Rational Decision Making** with Full Information or Rational (e.g., Bayesian) updating of beliefs in situations of uncertainty. (preferences and beliefs are given)
    - Decision Theoretic Maximization of Expected Utility
    - Equilibrium Behavior in a Bargaining Situation (Game Theoretic)
        - Principal Agent Situations
        - Collective Action Situations (PD, Coordination, tragedy of the commons)

2. I's Action stems from application of **Heuristics or Limited Rationality** (Not utility maximizing or equilibrium behavior – i.e., you could do better) (preferences and beliefs are given)
    - Ecological Rationality

3. I's Action stems from # 1 or #2 but preferences (and other relevant beliefs) are not given. Instead, beliefs and preferences come from…
    - Socialization into I's culture
    - I's identity
    - I's emotional reactions
    - Other psychological states (like personality)
    - The specific way I's brain processes information (of course, all the theories of action above ultimately stem from underlying modes of information processing in the brain, but those modes are not emphasized in those theories).
    - I's rational selection of preferences (and beliefs)

4. I's Action stems from her biology (this is of course true for everything, but where other theories ignore this, these theories of action highlight it)

4. Description and Assessment (empirical): If there is an empirical contribution of some kind (g-k) describe and evaluate that contribution in enough detail that we can understand it. Evaluate the extent to which the intended theoretical contribution has been successfully achieved.

SCHEDULE BY CLASS WEEK:

1. Introduction

2. **Discussion:** The Big picture: States that work: What does that mean and how does it happen?
   Papers: Initial topic discussion

3. **Discussion:** What accounts for the distribution of citizen preferences over parties? "Retrospective" Performance Evaluations (Accountability)
   Papers: Final topic discussion

4. **Discussion:** What accounts for the distribution of citizen preferences over parties? "Retrospective" Prospective Policy Preferences
   Papers: Students A and B present Literature and Theory (strict limit of 15 minutes presenting – must be a slide show).

5. **Discussion:** Given a distribution of *voter preferences for parties*, what accounts for the distribution of *electoral support* over parties? Sincere vs. Strategic Voting (and turnout)
   Papers: Students C and D present Literature and Theory (strict limit of 15 minutes presenting – must be a slide show).

6. **Discussion:** Given a legislature, what drives the composition (and duration) of the government? Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.
   Papers: Students A and B present Literature and Theory (strict limit of 15 minutes presenting – must be a slide show).

7. **Discussion:** Given a legislature and government, what drives policy choice?
   Papers: Students C and D present Literature and Theory (strict limit of 15 minutes presenting – must be a slide show).

8. **Discussion:** Why are people more or less interested in or knowledgeable about politics? And, why does the distribution of political knowledge and interest differ across countries?
   Papers: Students A and B present Research Design and Data (strict limit of 15 minutes presenting – must be a slide show).

9. **Discussion:** Dynamic Representation – Can citizens actually get what they want (and which citizens get what they want)?
   Papers: Students C and D present Research Design and Data (strict limit of 15 minutes presenting – must be a slide show).

10. **Papers:** Paper Workshop

11. **Discussion:** The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Accountability OR Designing Constitutions.

12. **Papers:** Final Paper Presentations. [note: final paper due last day of finals]

Reading list

*Please read all **numbered** pieces.*

Given small class size and the fact that I want you to produce papers, I am keeping the amount of reading limited. I chose the most prominent (often book length) recent work in a given area since it usually includes summaries of much of the literature up to that point.

In addition, I have attempted to include works that represent different theoretical approaches – e.g., various kinds of rational choice approaches (bargaining, collective action, principal agent, decision theoretic, game theoretic) and have preferred theoretical to empirical work so that you will have maximum exposure to the ideas animating comparative politics rather than focusing mainly on measurement and data.

Most of the reading are articles you can get online. We read the whole or much of book for Prior 2018, Cox 1997, Duch and Stevenson 2008, Martin and Vanberg 2011*, and* Acemoglu and Robinson 2019. You may want to buy those.

The Big Picture

States that work: What does that mean and how does it happen?

We are going to start the course off thinking about what, from the point of view of the governed, is the point of having states? What are the dangers? And what are the conditions that need to obtain for states to deliver a mix of outcomes that maximizes the well-being of its citizens?

1. David Acemoglu and James Robinson, 2019. The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. Penguin Books.

   I would also recommend Francis Fukuyama's two volume series that starts with *The Origins of Political Order*. The offers a similar theory and many different historical cases.

The answer will motivate our focus, during the rest of the class on how different democratic systems manage to connect (or not) the desires and needs of citizens to the outcomes of government, which we can think of as a chain of responsiveness.

The Chain of Responsiveness

The chain of responsiveness starts with voters' wants, preferences, and needs and ends with policy outcomes. In between are many steps that can work well or badly in different political systems. In this class, we will examine each step in depth.

1. *Why do voters prefer the parties they do?*

   How do voters' wants, preferences, and needs get translated to attitudes about (and preferences for) different political parties?

2. *Why do voters vote for the parties they do?*

   Given voters have preferences over parties, how do these get translated to electoral support for those (or other) parties?

3. *How are votes and seats related and why?*

   Given a distribution of electoral support for parties, how does this support get translated to a distribution of legislative seats?

4. *Which governments form and why?*

   Given an electoral result, why is one distribution of executive authority (a government) chosen over others?

5. *Which policies are enacted and why?*

   Given a distribution of legislative seats and a government, what explains which policies are chosen?

Question 1: What accounts for the distribution of citizen preferences over parties?

Political scientists have suggested at least five broad answers to why citizens prefer the parties they do. These include:

- Voters understand parties to represent specific social groups and so prefer parties that represent the social groups to which they belong (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan, the Columbia School)

- Voters develop affective, psychological attachments to parties (The Michigan School).

- Voters are constantly exposed to elite messages through the media and process these messages in ways that impact voters' evaluations of parties (e.g., Zaller, Lodge, Prezworski and Sprague).

- Voters "reward or punish" parties based on retrospective assessments of the performance of parties (or perhaps use this information to select competent parties)

- Voters have policy preferences and vote prospectively for the parties that promise to enact (or otherwise demonstrate they are likely to enact) those policies.

While we could do a week or more on each of these, we will focus on the last two. However, in class I will provide a short summary of the key ideas from the first three.

Week 3 (an answer to Question 1): "Retrospective" Performance Evaluations (Accountability)

Accountability for Policy CHOICE:

1. David Fortunato, Nick Lin, Randy Stevenson, and Mathias Tromborg. 2021. "Attributing Policy Influence under Coalition Governance" *American Political Science Review.* **Please also read the first Appendix (about heuristics) to this article. It is available at randystevenson.com.**

2. Adams, James, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2011. "Is anybody listening? Evidence that voters do not respond to European parties' policy programmes." American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 370-382.

Accountability for Policy OUTCOMES:

3. Raymond Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson 2008. *The Economic Vote*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9. *For the question of voter preferences, we will focus on the idea of the competence signal and how it is modified by the distribution of authority. When we get to questions of strategic voting, we will return to this book and examine other chapters.*

4. Dynes, Adam M., and John B. Holbein. 2020. Noisy Retrospection: The Effect of Party Control on Policy Outcomes." *American Political Science Review* 114: 237-257.

Note: I have not assigned any separate readings about "clarity of responsibility" despite its centrality to comparative work on accountability and performance voting. The reason is that most of this work is empirical – lacking a carefully argued theory that connects clarity of responsibility to vote choices (or preferences). Duch and Stevenson, review the main empirical results on clarity and sketch the usual (implicit) theoretical argument behind it. You should think for yourself about the mechanism(s) that might drive the empirical relationship between clarity of responsibility and voting. Here is the classic cite (not assigned to read)

Powell, G. Bingham and Guy D. Whitten (1993). "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(2): 391-414.

Week 4 (an answer to Question 1): Prospective Policy Preferences

This week assumes that you have some knowledge of the spatial theory of policy voting. If not you can review: Nicholas Miller. 2014. "The Spatial Model of Social Choice and Voting." or Jim Adams, Jim Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman's *A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors*. [chapter 2].

Evidence for or against policy voting

Below, I have assigned two critiques of the common wisdom that that voters are largely incapable of policy voting or that their policy views (and other relevant beliefs) are simply partisan rationalizations. Implicitly, these works take the common wisdom as given and cite a great deal of work in that vein. You should read Fowler especially closely for the discussion of previous work.

1. Anthony Fowler 2020. "Partisan Intoxication or Policy Voting?" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science.*

2. Markus Prior. 2015. You cannot be Serious: The Impact of Accuracy Incentives on Partisan Bias in Reports of Economic Perceptions. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*.

Aside: what is the left-right? Is it aggregated policy preferences?

Given the tendency to use LR as a summary of voters' policy views (and then to show that voters often vote for the party that is closest to them on the Left-Right), we need to understand what the "left-right" really is in the minds of voters before we examine work that assumes it is a summary of a voter's preferences about policy.

1. Fortunato, David and Randolph T. Stevenson 2013. "Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies: The Effect of Coalition Participation." *American Journal of Political Science*.

2. Lee, Seonghui, Philip Santoso, and Randy Stevenson. 2021. "The Nature and Sources of Voters' Beliefs about the Left-Right Positions of Political Parties." Manuscript.

3. Fortunato, David, Stevenson, Randolph T. and Greg Vonnahme 2016. "Context, Heuristics, and Political Knowledge: Explaining Cross-National Variation in Citizens' Left-Right Knowledge" 2016. *Journal of Politics*.

Question 2: Given a distribution of ***voter preferences for parties***, what accounts for the distribution of ***electoral support*** over parties?

Week 5: Strategic Voting

Is there a one to one between preference for a party and voting for that party? – i.e., sincere voting?

We will not read something specific on sincere voting. It is addressed, by implication, in the work on strategic voting.

Ordinary strategic voting (strategic voting at the district level)

You need to understand the decision-theoretic logic of ordinary strategic voting in SMD systems and its extension to multi-party systems.

1. Black, Jerome.1978. "The Multicandidate Calculus of Voting: Application to Canadian Federal Elections." AJPS. OR Mckelvey and Ordeshook 1972. OR you can skip both these and instead work out for yourself the example in footnote 4 of chapter 8 of Duch and Stevenson 2008. [I may have you do this in class… be prepared]

Next, you need to understand (at least in principle) how Cox extends the decision-theoretic account to a game theoretic account and what the consequences of this might be for the kind of equilibria the theory predicts. As a bonus, you will get an explanation of Duverger's Law (know what that is). Finally, Cox offers a very general M+1 rule that is essential to know.

2. Cox, Gary W., (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge. Chapters 2, 4, 5.

Finally, having understood all that, do we really need the game theoretic model or will a decision-theoretic, reduced-form model be enough?

3. Fey, Mark, 1997. "Stability and Coordination in Duverger's Law: A Formal Model of Pre-election Polls and Strategic Voting," American Political Science Review.

Coalition Directed Voting

4. Duch, Raymond. Jeff May and David Armstrong. 2010. "Coalition directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies." *APSR*. 104(4).

5. Bargsted, Matias and Orit Kedar. 2009. "Coalition-Targeted Duvergerian Voting: How Expectations Affect Voter Choice under Proportional Representation." 2009. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2): 307- 323.

6. Raymond Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson 2008. *The Economic Vote*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10. *[**discussion paper only on relevant parts of 8 and 10] -see note next page.*

I have removed chapter 9 and added 10 from our previous reading of this book. This new chapter (and a lot of the theory in chapter 8) is concerned with how strategic voting incentives create a disconnect between actual economic voting behavior and the parties that the retrospective economic voter might prefer.

What about turnout? (i.e., some preferences don't get expressed in a vote)

This is an important question that we will skip for this course. Andre Blais is the go-to scholar on comparative turnout.

Andre Blais. 2000. *To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory.* Univ. of Pittsburgh Press.

Andre Blais. 2006. "What Effects Voter Turnout?" Annual review of Political Science.

Question 3: Given a distribution of votes for parties, what accounts for the distribution of seats in the legislature?

We will skip this question. It is well covered in other classes about electoral rules. The classic work on translating votes into seats is:

Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart. 1991. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems.* Yale University Press.

The mechanics of electoral systems are also well covered in Cox (1997).

There is also a large literature on why different countries adopt different electoral rules. Here are some of the better article-length treatments.

- Carles Boix. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. The American Political Science Review, 93(3):609–24, 1999.
- Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems. The American Political Science Review, 101(3):373– 91, 2007. 0
- Kenneth Benoit and Jacqueline Hayden. Institutional Change and Persistence: The Evolution of Poland's Electoral System, 1989-2001. The Journal of Politics, 66(2):396– 427, 2004. 8
- Kenneth Mori McElwain. Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1):32–47, 2008.

Question 4: Given a legislature, what drives the composition of the government?

Week 6: Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.

There is a vast literature on cabinet formation and duration. The first article by Laver summarizes much of the theoretical literature. The second is Laver and Shepsle's theory based on spatial bargaining (using Shepsle's earlier idea of structurally induced equilibria) and then two more modern pieces.

Who gets in and what so they get?

1. Laver, Michael. 1998. "Models of Government Formation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:1–25 *[pick the part you think is most important for discussion paper]

2. Laver and Shepsle 1990. "Coalitions and Cabinet Government." *APSR*.

3. Michael Laver and Ken Benoit. 2015. "The basic arithmetic of legislative decisions." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (2), 275-291.

4. Maria Thurk, Johan Hellstrom, and Holger Dorning. 2020. "Institutional constraints on cabinet formation: Veto points and party system dynamics" *European Journal of Political Research*.

The next piece is the latest in a large literature on the payoffs parties get for joining cabinets. It discusses previous literature on Gamson's Law, which (like Duverger's Law) is something every political scientist should know something about.

5. Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg. 2020. "What You See Is Not Always What You Get: Bargaining before an Audience under Multiparty Government." American Political Science review.

Question 5: Given a legislature and government, what drives policy choice?

The question of what drives policy choice fall into the five broad categories below:

- Spatial weighted voting (median, core, etc.) and pivotally more generally.
- Voting Power (ignoring policy positons)
- Agenda Power (roles in government and opposition)
- Bargaining among parties and enforcement of those bargains
- Policy Salience/issue intensity (we will examine this later)

Week 7: Theoretical Answers

1. Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg (2011) *Parliaments and Coalitions.* whole book.

2. Richard Katz and Peter Mair (2018) *Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties.* Chapter 1: The Problem. [I have this book and will scan the chapter]

3. Appendix A2 from David Fortunato, Nick Lin, Randy Stevenson, and Mathias Tromborg. 2021. "Attributing Policy Influence under Coalition Governance" *American Political Science Review.* This review covers a lot of material. You need to understand something about the various arguments for what confers policy influence to parties and also the empirical evidence for it, which this appendix tries to summarize.

A menu of Empirical/Measurement strategies for exploring what determines policy outcomes.

We will skip this. But here is some work showing how scholars have tried to measure what policies governments produce and so to understand which parties are actually able to get what they want. This may help you as you think about measurement in your own projects.

Sebastian Hartmann (2014), which uses an extensive data set on actual policy measures, reported by the Economist Intelligence Unit, for a large number of western democracies over time

- Sebastian Hartmann 2014. Partisan Policy-Making in Western Europe: How Ideology Influences the Content of Government Policies. (also gives you political business cycle theory)

- Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg 2014. "Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median, Ministerial Autonomy, and the Coalition Compromise." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 979–96. And their book which we already read.

- Thomson, et. al. 2017. “The fulfillment of parties’ election pledges: A comparative study on the impact of power sharing”, *American Journal of Political Science* 61 (3), 527-542.

    Royed, Naurin, and Thompson (2019) is their book length treatment.

- McDonald M., Mendes Silvia, and Ian Budge. 2004. “What Are Elections for? Conferring the Median Mandate.” *British Journal of Political Science* 34(1): 1-26.

    Other work in this vein is McDonald and Budge (2005), and Warwick (2011).

Other Questions Critical to the Chain of Responsiveness

Week 8 question: Why are people more or less interested in or knowledgeable about politics? And, why does the distribution of political knowledge and interest differ across countries?

1. Marcus Prior. 2018. *Hooked: How Politics Captures People's Interest.* Cambridge. Whole book. Not only is this the most comprehensive work on individual level differences in political interest, it is a great example of using panel data to explore change over time.

2. Seonghui Lee and Randy Stevenson. 2021. *Explaining Cross-National Differences in Political Interest.* Manuscript (I will provide this).

Off the Chain (or maybe the chain as a whole)

Week 9: Dynamic Representation

The possibility that voters can impact policy directly (modern versions of “Dynamic representation”)

1. Devin Caughey Christopher Warshaw. Policy Preferences and Policy Change: Dynamic Responsiveness in the American States, 1936–2014, *American Political Science Review*. May, 2018. 112(2): 249-266.

2. "Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics, 1981--2016." *American Political Science Review.* 113(3): 674-693. (with Devin Caughey and Tom O'Grady)

3. Seth Hill, 2021. Frustrated Majorities: How Issue Intensity Enables Smaller Groups of Voters to Get What They Want. Book manuscript (under review). [I will provide this.]

Week 11: What role does civil society and social capital play in the emergence and stability of democracies?

The first article is a broad review of the "decline in social capital" argument. I am assigning it rather than the original work because it does a good job summarizing the main arguments of those works as well as the many different responses to them. As a political scientist, you should have an opinion on this debate. Next, I provide a more recent application of the social capital idea by its main proponent, Robert Putnam, so we can see how the idea may be used to address a variety of questions.

1. Dietlind Stolle and Marc Hooghe. 2004. 'Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in Western Societies.' B.J.Pol.S. 35: 149– 167.

2. Putnam, Robert D. 2007. 'E pluribus unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century the 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture.' Scandinavian Political Studies 30(2): 137-174.

Ingelhart and Welzel provide another take on the idea that mass attitudes are essential to democratic emergence (or modernization more generally) and maintenance. Like Putnam's work, it has engendered a fierce response from critics. Here I provide a summary article written in 2010 that is less tied to the specific measures of attitudes they proposed in the early 2000's (which were highly criticized) but that examines the more general idea that mass attitudes (culture) matters to development.,

3. Inglehart, Ronald and Christopher Welzel. 2010. 'Changing Mass Priorities: The Link between Modernization and Democracy.' Perspectives on Politics 8 (2): 551-567.

And general critique of this idea:

4. Fails, Matthew D. and Heather N. Pierce. 2010. 'Changing Mass Attitudes and Democratic Deepening.' Political Research Quarterly 63(1): 174-187.